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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2003, Randy James Newcomb was arrested for first degree
1
driving while impaired and for felony test refusal. Newcomb was
sentenced to four years imprisonment, but the sentence was stayed
2
for seven years. In 2007, Newcomb was arrested for violating his
3
probation, was sent to jail, and was again released in 2009. Under
Minnesota law, if a person is arrested for a first degree DWI and
that person’s sentence is stayed, the sentencing court must place
4
that person on five years of supervised release. Evidently, the
5
sentencing court failed to do this with Newcomb. Once Newcomb
was imprisoned, a correctional officer wrote to the sentencing
6
court asking that the court add a term of conditional release. The
judge did not respond, but someone within the Minnesota
Department of Corrections administratively added a conditional
7
release to Newcomb’s sentence.
Thus, Newcomb’s sentence without the conditional release was
8
set to expire April 13, 2010. If, on the other hand, the conditional

1. State ex rel. Newcomb v. Roy, No. A10-2075, 2011 WL 2437489, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2015) (“[W]hen the
court commits a person to the custody of the commissioner of corrections under
this subdivision, it shall provide that after the person has been released from
prison the commissioner shall place the person on conditional release for five
years.”).
5. Newcomb, 2011 WL 2437489, at *1.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Id.
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release had been imposed in accordance with Minnesota law,
Newcomb’s conditional release would have expired on January 12,
9
2014. On April 15, 2010, just two days after Newcomb’s original
sentence expired, Newcomb was arrested for violating a condition
10
of his release. Newcomb’s conditional release was revoked, and he
11
was sentenced for an additional 150 days.
While Newcomb was able to successfully petition for habeas
corpus, what options would have been available to Newcomb if he
did not discover the violation of his rights until after he had already
served his additional time? Under the current law, it would all
depend on in which jurisdiction Newcomb had the fortune or
12
misfortune to have been imprisoned.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that
prisoners must seek a favorable termination in habeas proceedings
before challenging the fact or duration of confinement in a 42
13
U.S.C. § 1983 action. In Spencer v. Kemna, however, the Court
walked back this holding, hinting at the possibility that it would not
14
apply where the prisoner has been released from prison. Some
circuit courts have, after counting the votes, decided that the Heck
15
“favorable termination rule” does not apply to released prisoners.
Other circuit courts have decided to apply the Heck rule according
to dicta pointing to the proposition that the favorable termination
rule would apply once the prisoner was released even though
16
habeas proceedings would be foreclosed. The Eighth Circuit
17
follows the latter approach.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See infra Section II.D (discussing the circuit split in which some
jurisdictions require released prisoners to have had a favorable termination of
their matter while others do not impose such a requirement).
13. 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994); see infra Section II.B (discussing the history and
outcome of Heck v. Humphrey).
14. 523 U.S. 1 (1998); see infra Section II.C (discussing the plurality of
justices that held that the favorable termination rule would not apply to released
prisoners to bar a § 1983 claim).
15. See infra Section II.D (discussing the circuit split, with some circuits
following the holding of Heck v. Humphrey).
16. See infra Section II.D (discussing the circuit split, with some circuits
following the holding of Spencer v. Kemna).
17. See infra Part III (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s application of the Heck
rule in such cases as Newmy v. Johnson and Entzi v. Redmann).
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This article examines Heck, the origins of the current conflict,
18
and the current circuit split in Part II. This article also examines
19
the application of the rule by the Eighth Circuit in Part III. In Part
IV, the article looks at habeas corpus law as it pertains to the Heck
20
favorable termination rule. In Part V, this article argues that the
Eighth Circuit is on the wrong side of the split and its decisions are
21
due to be overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. The article
22
concludes the argument in Part VI.
II. HISTORY, HECK, AND HECK’S AFTERMATH
A.

A Brief History of § 1983

This article will rely on the history of § 1983 described in
23
Monroe v. Pape. Section 1983 began as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act
24
of 1871. The passage of the Act was spurred by the Union-general
25
turned-United-States-President, Ulysses S. Grant. On March 23,
1871, President Grant sent a message to Congress reading:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the
Union rendering life and property insecure and the
carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue
dangerous. The proof that such a condition of affairs
exists in some localities is now before the Senate. That the
power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State
authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the
Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part VI.
23. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978). Monroe was responsible for overruling, at least implicitly, Blyew v.
United States, which had upheld a circuit court decision essentially impeding a
black person from testifying against white defendants who had killed several of her
family members. 80 U.S. 581, 583, 595 (1871). For an excellent recitation of the
facts of the Blyew case, see Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional
Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469, 469–74 (1989).
24. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 is also commonly
known as the third Enforcement Act. Historical Events: Ku Klux Klan Bill Enacted—
April 20, 1871, MILLER CTR., http://millercenter.org/president/about/historicalevents#4_20 (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). This article refers to the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871 as the “Act.”
25. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
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existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not
clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation
as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure
life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in
26
all parts of the United States.
27
The record shows three main purposes of the Act. First, the
Act was meant to override certain state laws that allowed state
agents to abuse their authority by depriving people of their
28
constitutional rights. Second, the Act was meant to “provide a
29
remedy where state law was inadequate.” Finally, the Act was
meant to correct situations in which there was a state remedy in
place which was “adequate in theory, [but] not available in
30
practice.” In this, it was the specter of the Klan and the
26. Id. at 172–73.
27. Id. at 173.
28. Id. However, according to one U.S. Senator, Senator Sloss of Alabama,
“there were no such laws.” Id. Senator Sloss protested:
The first section of this bill prohibits any invidious legislation by States
against the rights or privileges of citizens of the United States. The
object of this section is not very clear, as it is not pretended by its
advocates on this floor that any State has passed any laws endangering
the rights or privileges of the colored people.
Id. Senator Sloss appears to have forgotten the Black Codes, which, beginning as
early as 1865, required blacks “to make contracts, work sunup to sundown, and ask
permission before leaving the premises . . . .” LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT
SOUTH CAROLINA KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871–1872, at 3 (1996). Additionally, the
Black Codes forbade any black person from working in any profession outside of
agriculture. Id.
29. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173. Senator Sherman of Ohio expressed the purpose
thus:
[I]t is said the reason is that any offense may be committed upon a
negro by a white man, and a negro cannot testify in any case against a
white man, so that the only way by which any conviction can be had in
Kentucky in those cases is in the United States courts, because the
United States courts enforce the United States laws by which negroes
may testify.
Id. at 173–74.
30. Id. at 174. As Mr. Lowe artfully described it:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and
lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unoffending
American citizens, the local administrations have been found
inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective. Combinations,
darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the
worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped [sic] of justice.
Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are
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31

compliance of state officials that the Act was meant to remedy. As
Senator Osborn put it:
That the State courts in the several States have been
unable to enforce the criminal laws of their respective
States or to suppress the disorders existing, and in fact
that the preservation of life and property in many sections
of the country is beyond the power of the State
government, is a sufficient reason why Congress should,
so far as they have authority under the Constitution, enact
the laws necessary for the protection of citizens of the
32
United States.
B.

Heck v. Humphrey

Roy Heck was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in an
33
Indiana state court. While Heck’s appeal was being considered,
Heck filed a § 1983 claim against Indiana prosecutors and an

searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress.
Id. at 175.
31. See id. at 175–76 (“While one main scourge of the evil—perhaps the
leading one—was the Ku Klux Klan, the remedy created was not a remedy against
it or its members but against those who representing a State in some capacity were
unable or unwilling to enforce a state law.”).
32. Id. at 176.
33. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994). Roy and Rickie Heck were
husband and wife. Heck v. Indiana, 552 N.E.2d 446, 448 (Ind. 1990). Rickie,
however, commenced dissolution proceedings. Id. On the evening of January 6,
1986, several witnesses in the vicinity of Rickie’s trailer heard an argument
between Rickie and a man. Id. While some witnesses did not see the person with
whom Rickie was arguing, others identified the other party as a tall, young man.
Id. at 448–49. Just one witness identified the other party as Roy. Id. at 449. The
witness, however, only identified him by his voice. Id. Following the argument,
Rickie disappeared sometime between January 5 and 6, 1986. Id. at 448. Nearly ten
months later, Rickie’s body was found on a farm owned by Roy. Id. The pathologist
opined upon his second examination of the body, that a blow to the head caused
Rickie’s death. Id. Roy exhibited a great deal of suspicious behavior following the
disappearance of Rickie. See id. at 449. First, Roy told acquaintances that Rickie
had left for Florida. Id. However, one of Rickie’s bags was found in Roy’s home. Id.
Second, Roy requested that a couple of his female companions call the police
pretending to be Rickie. Id. Next, Roy requested that his daughter and girlfriend
dispose of several bags that were owned by Rickie and spread pepper over the
place where Rickie’s body was eventually found. Id. The jury returned a verdict of
guilty on the count of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 448.
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34

investigator. The complaint alleged that the defendants had
35
knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence.
The federal district court dismissed the claim without
prejudice as the claim implicated the legality of Roy’s
36
confinement. While this decision was on appeal in federal court,
the Indiana Supreme Court upheld Roy’s conviction and sentence
37
on direct appeal. When the Seventh Circuit finally decided the
case, the court affirmed, holding that:
If, regardless of the relief sought, the plaintiff is
challenging the legality of his conviction, so that if he won
his case the state would be obliged to release him even if
he hadn’t sought that relief, the suit is classified as an
application for habeas corpus and the plaintiff must
exhaust his state remedies, on pain of dismissal if he fails
38
to do so.
39
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. According to the
Court, the action lay at the intersection of § 1983 and the federal
40
habeas corpus statute. While § 1983 does not necessarily require
an exhaustion of state remedies, an action brought under the

34. Heck, 512 U.S. at 478–79. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
35. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1993).
39. Heck v. Humphrey, 510 U.S. 1068 (1994).
40. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). Section
2254 provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State; or [that] there is an absence of available State
corrective process; or circumstances exist that render such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (emphasis added).
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federal habeas corpus statute does require a plaintiff to exhaust all
41
state remedies.
42
The Court began by reviewing relevant case law. First, Preiser
v. Rodriguez held that an inmate challenging the fact or duration of
43
confinement must do so through a habeas corpus proceeding.
The Heck Court noted that the Preiser Court, in dictum, opined that
an action for damages may be brought through a § 1983 action,
because an action for damages, rather than release, is not
44
challenging the fact or duration of confinement. The Heck Court
rejected this notion, stating:
That statement may not be true, however, when
establishing the basis for the damages claim necessarily
demonstrates the invalidity of the conviction. In that
situation, the claimant can be said to be “attacking . . . the
fact or length of . . . confinement,” bringing the suit
within the other dictum of Preiser: “Congress has
determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or
length of their confinement, and that specific
determination must override the general terms of § 1983.”
In the last analysis, we think the dicta of Preiser to be an
unreliable, if not an unintelligible, guide: that opinion
had no cause to address, and did not carefully consider,
45
the damages question before us today.
The Court then went on to reject the petitioner’s contention
46
that the issue was decided in Wolff v. McDonnell. In applying Preiser,

41. Heck, 512 U.S. at 480–81 (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496,
501 (1982)). In Patsy, Patsy sued her employer, Florida International University,
claiming that she was impermissibly denied opportunities based on race and sex.
457 U.S. at 498. While the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to the district
court for a determination regarding state remedies, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, declaring, “this Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not a
prerequisite to an action under § 1983 . . . .” Id. at 500–01.
42. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481–83.
43. Id. at 481 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488–90 (1973)).
Preiser involved a challenge by inmates who were denied good-time credit as a
result of disciplinary proceedings. 411 U.S. at 476. The inmates demanded
injunctive relief that, if granted, would result in the inmates’ release from custody.
Id. at 476–77.
44. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 494).
45. Id. at 481–82 (citation omitted) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490).
46. Id. at 482 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). In Wolff,
Wolff brought a § 1983 action on behalf of himself and other inmates of the
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the Wolff Court held that while Wolff’s action for restoration of
good time credits was barred, the suit for damages was not, even
though it “required determination of the validity of the procedures
employed for imposing sanctions, including loss of good time, for
47
flagrant or serious misconduct.” The Heck Court concluded,
however, that Wolff only allowed a § 1983 claim for using the wrong
48
process rather than for denying good time credits. Further, the
use of the wrong procedure did not affect the denial of the good
time credits, which would call into question the fact or duration of
49
confinement. Therefore, to complete the tautology, the allowance
of the case to continue for monetary damages did not affect the
50
fact or duration of confinement.
As a § 1983 action is a sort of tort action, the Court
determined that a study of common law tort actions would provide
51
guidance. The tort of malicious prosecution provided the best
analogy because “it permits damages for confinement imposed
52
pursuant to legal process.” Malicious prosecution requires that the
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, Lincoln, Nebraska. 418 U.S. at 542.
Wolff alleged that the disciplinary process did not comply with Due Process
requirements. Id. at 543. Wolff sued for restoration of good time credits and
monetary damages. Id.
47. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554.
48. Heck, 512 U.S. at 482–83 (“[T]he claim as one of ‘damages for the
deprivation of civil rights,’ rather than damages for the deprivation of good-time
credits, we think this passage recognized a § 1983 claim for using the wrong
procedures, not for reaching the wrong result (i.e., denying good-time credits).
Nor is there any indication in the opinion, or any reason to believe, that using the
wrong procedures necessarily vitiated the denial of good-time credits. Thus, the
claim at issue in Wolff did not call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff’s
continuing confinement.”). The distinction between an attack on a procedure and
an attack on a result has since been walked back by Edwards v. Balisok. 520 U.S.
641, 645–46 (1997). In Balisok, an inmate filed a § 1983 claim alleging that the
procedure used to deprive him of thirty days of good-time credit was deficient. Id.
at 643. Balisok requested damages and injunctive relief. Id. His amended
complaint did not request restoration of the credit. Id. at 644. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that a claim only attacking the procedure is always
cognizable. Id. In holding that Balisok’s claim ran afoul of Heck, the Court
reasoned that even attacking the procedure used to deprive Balisok of good-time
credits could call into question the fact or length of confinement. Id. at 645–46.
49. Heck, 512 U.S. at 483.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 484 (noting also that a claim for false imprisonment is a less
applicable candidate as an award for false imprisonment only covered the time of
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previous criminal proceeding be terminated in favor of the
53
accused. According to the Court,
This requirement “avoids parallel litigation over the issues
of probable cause and guilt . . . and it precludes the
possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort
action after having been convicted in the underlying
criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial
policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions
54
arising out of the same or identical transaction.”
The Court ultimately held that,
[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by
a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
55
writ of habeas corpus.
This holding has since become known as the favorable
56
termination rule.

arrest up until arraignment, but did not include damages regarding confinement
as malicious prosecution would).
53. Id.; see Carey v. Sheets, 67 Ind. 375, 379 (1879) (“As a rule, it must be
averred and proved, in an action for a malicious prosecution, that the prosecution
complained of is at an end, and that it has terminated favorably to the plaintiff.”).
See generally Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 39 Pa. 288, 292 (1861) (discussing the
elements required for a successful claim for malicious prosecution).
54. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 (quoting 8 STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE, &
ALFRED W. GANS, AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:5, at 24 (1991)).
55. Id. at 486–87. The Heck rule has since been described as being based
upon, amongst other ideas, the concept of comity. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (“These considerations of linguistic specificity, history, and
comity led the Court to find an implicit exception from § 1983’s otherwise broad
scope for actions that lie ‘within the core of habeas corpus.’” (quoting Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973)); see also Chatman v. Slagle, 107 F.3d 380, 382
(7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (“Heck extends the Preiser rule to include § 1983
suits which request monetary, rather than injunctive, relief, for reasons of finality,
consistency, and comity.”).
56. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 264 (4th Cir. 2008).
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The Roots of the Conflict

In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter noted that the
analysis of the majority could lead to inequitable results by shutting
57
potential litigants out of court. Justice Souter posited the
following hypothetical:
Consider the case of a former slave framed by Ku Klux
Klan-controlled law-enforcement officers and convicted by
a Klan-controlled state court of, for example, raping a
white woman; and suppose that the unjustly convicted
defendant did not (and could not) discover the proof of
unconstitutionality until after his release from state
custody. If it were correct to say that § 1983 independently
requires a person not in custody to establish the prior
invalidation of his conviction, it would have been equally
right to tell the former slave that he could not seek
federal relief even against the law-enforcement officers
who framed him unless he first managed to convince the
state courts that his conviction was unlawful. That would
be a result hard indeed to reconcile either with the
purpose of § 1983 or with the origins of what was
“popularly known as the Ku Klux Act,” the statute having
been enacted in part out of concern that many state
courts were “in league with those who were bent upon
abrogation of federally protected rights.” It would also be
a result unjustified by the habeas statute or any other
58
post–§ 1983 enactment.

57. Heck, 512 U.S. at 501 (Souter, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 501–02 (citations omitted) (quoting Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S.
651, 657 (1951); Mitchem v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972)). The notion of a
framed person seeking redress through § 1983 is not far-fetched. In fact, that is
exactly what happened in Hibma v. Odegaard. 576 F.Supp. 1549 (W.D. Wis. 1984),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 769 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1985). In that case, three deputy
sheriffs undertook to frame Hibma for burglaries that they themselves had
committed. Id. at 1551. The deputies contrived a plan in which they would get
Hibma to steal a pistol and then sell it to the deputies’ confederate. Id. The plan
went off as expected, and the deputies brought Hibma in for questioning on the
burglary and theft of the pistol. Id. The deputies then ignored Hibma’s requests
for a lawyer and requests for medical treatment for his narcotics withdrawals,
eventually obtaining a confession from Hibma. Id. Hibma also gave consent for the
deputies to search his home. Id. The deputies then proceeded to Hibma’s home
where they planted evidence regarding their own burglaries. Id. at 1552. When the
sheriff and other deputies arrived, they found the evidence. Id. Hibma eventually
pled guilty to the burglary and theft of the handgun, in return for which the
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, responded by stating
that the application of the rule should not depend on whether the
59
prisoner is in or out of custody. The majority went on to explain
that § 1983 was not intended to give redress to every possible
60
harm. For instance, the immunity doctrines bar recovery against
61
judges.
In Spencer v. Kemna, the Court was asked to decide whether a
62
habeas corpus petition was moot after a prisoner’s release. As the
prosecutor dismissed the other burglary charges. Id. Hibma spent over a year in
jail for the offense before being released. Id. Hibma did not learn about the
planted evidence until three years later. Id. This case was decided before the Heck
decision; because Hibma did not know about the violation until after his release, it
is likely that the case never would have survived the favorable termination rule.
Challenging the planting of evidence, which led to Hibma’s pleading guilty, likely
would have also challenged the fact or length of Hibma’s confinement.
59. Heck, 512 U.S. at 490 n.10 (“We think the principle barring collateral
attacks—a longstanding and deeply rooted feature of both the common law and
our own jurisprudence—is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a
convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated.”).
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (“But if, as Justice Souter
appears to suggest, the goal of our interpretive enterprise under § 1983 were to
provide a remedy for all conceivable invasions of federal rights that freedmen may
have suffered at the hands of officials of the former States of the Confederacy, the
entire landscape of our § 1983 jurisprudence would look very different. We would
not, for example, have adopted the rule that judicial officers have absolute
immunity from liability for damages under § 1983, a rule that would prevent
recovery by a former slave who had been tried and convicted before a corrupt state
judge in league with the Ku Klux Klan.”). The doctrine of judicial immunity is, of
course, explicit from the language of the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)
(“[E]xcept that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.”). The statute, however, has been found to not abrogate other
common law immunities. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993). Some
of these immunities include the Feres doctrine, which blocks suits arising out of
actions incident to service. See Bowen v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1997)
(sovereign immunity); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979) (Eleventh
Amendment immunity); DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 296–97 (2d Cir. 2003)
(prosecutorial immunity).
62. 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). The Court determined that a habeas petition was
moot once the prisoner was no longer incarcerated. Id. at 18. Most state courts
lying within the Eighth Circuit have reached the same conclusion when examining
state habeas petitions. See Anderson v. State, 98 S.W.3d 403, 404 (Ark. 2003)
(dismissing appeal of denial of habeas petition where the prisoner had been
released from custody); Case v. Wood, 377 N.W.2d 924, 924 (Minn. 1985)
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petitioner had already been released from prison, he was required
63
to show collateral consequences of the conviction. Spencer
argued that he would suffer collateral consequences due to Heck’s
favorable termination rule; if Spencer’s habeas corpus petition
were dismissed, his ability to level a § 1983 action would also be
64
foreclosed. The Court concluded that the argument was:
[A] great non sequitur, unless one believes (as we do not)
that a § 1983 action for damages must always and
everywhere be available. It is not certain, in any event, that
a § 1983 damages claim would be foreclosed. If, for
example, petitioner were to seek damages “for using the
wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result,”
and if that procedural defect did not “necessarily imply
the invalidity of” the revocation, then Heck would have no
65
application all.
Justice Souter, writing for the four concurring justices, argued
that the holding in Heck would not foreclose Spencer’s § 1983 claim
as “Heck did not hold that a released prisoner in Spencer’s
circumstances is out of court on a § 1983 claim, and for reasons
explained in [his] Heck concurrence, it would be unsound to read
66
either Heck or the habeas statute as requiring any such result.”
According to the concurrence, the broad and general § 1983
statute should be read in light of the specific habeas corpus statute,
as such a reading would require § 1983 to yield to the habeas
67
corpus statute only where they conflict.
(dismissing appeal of petition where prisoner was already released from custody);
State ex rel. D.W. v. Hensley, 574 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (declaring
petition for release from involuntary hospitalization moot after hospitalization had
terminated); State ex rel. Magrum v. Nygaard, 38 N.W.2d 370, 370 (N.D. 1949)
(declaring habeas petition moot where petitioner was ordered released from
custody by a different order of the court); Moeller v. Solem, 395 N.W.2d 165, 165–
66 (S.D. 1986) (habeas petition was moot after the petitioner had been paroled
and the conviction would not affect parole eligibility).
63. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7–8.
64. Id. at 17.
65. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 482–83, 487).
66. Id. at 19 (Souter, J., concurring). Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined the concurrence. See id. at 18–21.
67. Id. at 20 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 500) (“I also thought we were bound
to recognize the apparent scope of § 1983 when no limitation was required for the
sake of honoring some other statute or weighty policy, as in the instance of habeas.
Accordingly, I thought it important to read the Court’s Heck opinion as subjecting
only inmates seeking § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or
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Justice Stevens was the final vote. In his dissent, he argued
that the claim was not moot as the petitioner was challenging the
facts underlying the conviction rather than simply asking to be
69
released. Because the conviction could have lasting effects on the
petitioner, the petitioner had a “redressable [sic]” interest in
70
vindicating his good name.
In a final footnote, Justice Stevens addressed the contention
between the majority and the concurrence, stating, “[g]iven the
Court’s holding that petitioner does not have a remedy under the
habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter explains, that
71
he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
D.

The Split

Following the Spencer decision, a circuit split formed. Some
jurisdictions, upon counting the votes of the concurrence and the
dissent, determined that the favorable termination rule did not
72
apply to released prisoners. The Tenth Circuit, for instance, held
that the favorable termination rule should not apply to released
prisoners because, according to the court:
We are also persuaded that the Spencer plurality approach
is both more just and more in accordance with the
purpose of § 1983 than the approach of those circuits that
strictly apply Heck even to petitioners who have been
released from custody. If a petitioner is unable to obtain
confinement to ‘a requirement analogous to the malicious-prosecution tort’s
favorable-termination requirement,’ lest the plain breadth of § 1983 be
unjustifiably limited at the expense of persons not ‘in custody’ within the meaning
of the habeas statute.”).
68. See id. at 22–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 22.
70. Id. at 23.
71. Id. at 25 n.8 (emphasis omitted).
72. Newmy v. Johnson, 758 F.3d 1008, 1010–12 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Cohen
v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1315–17 (10th Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Johnson, 535
F.3d 262, 267–68 (4th Cir. 2008); Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501
F.3d 592, 599–605 (6th Cir. 2007); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875–78 (9th
Cir. 2002); Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 73–75 (2d Cir. 2001); Carr v. O’Leary,
167 F.3d 1124, 1125–28 (7th Cir. 1999)). In total, seven circuits have adopted the
reasoning of the Spencer concurrence in holding that the Heck favorable
termination rule does not apply to released prisoners. Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1316
(“We are instead persuaded by the reasoning of the Second, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that we are free to follow the five-Justice
plurality’s approach in Spencer on this unsettled question of law.”).
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habeas relief—at least where this inability is not due to the
petitioner’s own lack of diligence—it would be unjust to
place his claim for relief beyond the scope of § 1983
where “exactly the same claim could be redressed if
brought by a former prisoner who had succeeded in
73
cutting his custody short through habeas.”
Other courts decided to hold out for clear direction from the
74
U.S. Supreme Court.
III. EIGHTH CIRCUIT APPLICATION
The Eighth Circuit has decided to continue the application of
the Heck rule to cases in which the prisoner has been released until
there is more concrete direction from the Court.
In Entzi v. Redmann, Entzi was convicted in North Dakota of
75
gross sexual imposition. While in prison, he was required to
76
undergo sex offender treatment. As part of the treatment, the
participants were required to “work to lose their denial,” which
77
would necessitate admitting their crimes. Entzi refused, protesting
that as he had testified to his innocence at trial, a later admission
78
would subject him to perjury charges. Entzi’s refusal led to prison
officials revoking “performance-based sentence reductions,” an act
79
that Entzi claimed lengthened his sentence by one year. In spite
of attempts to the contrary, Entzi was released from prison and
80
filed suit against his probation officer and prison officials.
73. Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1316–17 (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21 (Souter, J.,
concurring)).
74. Newmy, 758 F.3d at 1010; see also Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003
(8th Cir. 2007); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208–12 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that,
after refusing to adopt the Spencer concurrence, successful completion of a
diversionary program was not a favorable termination); Randell v. Johnson, 227
F.3d 300, 301–02 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (refusing to adopt the Spencer
concurrence); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80–82 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[F]ederal
courts [must] follow [the Court’s] directly applicable precedent, even if that
precedent appears weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent decisions, and
to leave to the Court ‘the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” (citing
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)).
75. Entzi, 485 F.3d at 1000.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1000–01.
80. Id. at 1001 (“Several days before Entzi’s scheduled release from prison,
his probation officer, Patrick Bohn, filed a petition to revoke probation based on
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The court held that Entzi’s claims were barred by the Heck rule
81
in spite of the fact that he had already been released from prison.
The court stated that it was bound to apply the Heck rule until the
U.S. Supreme Court had made a definitive determination to the
82
contrary.
IV. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS LAW
28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides for habeas relief for state prisoners
where custody contravenes the Constitution or a United States
83
treaty. Traditionally, the only remedy for a successful habeas
84
petition was equitable relief. This often meant the restoration of
85
good time credits or release from custody. More and more,
however, the habeas petition has been used to fight conditions in
86
prisons.
Entzi’s failure to complete this sex offender treatment. On September 3, 2004, the
state trial court dismissed Bohn’s petition, because it thought the requirement
that Entzi admit his guilt during treatment ‘violates the 5th Amendment right to
be free from self-incrimination’ and also ‘violates common sense.’”).
81. Id. at 1003. For a more recent and thorough application of the Heck rule
by the Eighth Circuit, see generally Newmy v. Johnson, 758 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir.
2014). In Newmy, Newmy sued his parole officer for falsely reporting that Newmy
did not report as required. Id. at 1009. The alleged false report caused Newmy’s
parole to be revoked. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court’s determination that the claim was not cognizable because Newmy had not
obtained a favorable termination. Id. at 1011–12. The court noted, “[w]e
recognize that this rule could preclude a damages remedy for an inmate who is
detained for only a short time with limited access to legal resources, but that is a
consequence of the principle barring collateral attacks that was applied in Heck.”
Id. at 1012.
82. Entzi, 485 F.3d at 1003.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).
84. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1971)
(“[H]abeas corpus has been utilized as a procedural method of airing prisoner’s
complaint and granting equitable relief where relief was indicated.”).
85. Id.
86. Id. These petitions concern a wide variety of issues. See Rozelle v. Rossi,
307 F.App’x 640, 642 (3d Cir. 2008) (prescription acne medication); Bembry v. St.
Lawrence, No. CV407-046, 2007 WL 4256984, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 30, 2007) (“His
complaint seeks redress for overcrowding, double-celling, long hours of lockdown,
cold food, small food portions, dirty food utensils, poor sanitation and air
circulation, dirty showers, deprivation of property, deprivation of medical care,
increased stress, exposure to homosexual activities, lack of jobs, deprivation of
intelligent conversation, limited access to the law library, lost mail, deprivation of
family contact, deprivation of home furnishings, and the high cost of phone
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The writ cannot be granted unless state court remedies have
87
been exhausted. The requirement that state court remedies be
88
exhausted is generally known as the exhaustion doctrine. This
doctrine was created because:
Early federal intervention in state criminal proceedings
would tend to remove federal questions from the state
courts, isolate those courts from constitutional issues, and
thereby remove their understanding of and hospitality to
federally protected interests. Second, (the doctrine)
preserves orderly administration of state judicial business,
preventing the interruption of state adjudication by
89
federal habeas proceedings.
However, the principal “cannot be used as a blunderbuss to
shatter the attempt at litigation of constitutional claims without
regard to the purposes that underlie the doctrine and that called it
90
into existence.”
The exhaustion doctrine only applies to claims that are still
91
remediable in state court proceedings. Further, the exhaustion
92
doctrine, being a rule of comity, is not inflexible. The exhaustion
doctrine does not apply at all if there is a complete absence of state

service.”); Richards v. Richie, No. CIV. 13–3029, 2015 WL 1522237, at *2–3 (D.
Minn. Mar. 30, 2015) (gluten-free dental floss).
87. See supra text accompanying note 41.
88. See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).
89. Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973)
(quoting Note, Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1038, 1094 (1970)). Or, put more daintily, “it would be unseemly in our dual
system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction
without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.”
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
90. Braden, 410 U.S. at 490; Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546, 547 (5th Cir.
1965) (footnote omitted) (“The doctrine requiring a state prisoner to exhaust all
state remedies as a prerequisite to federal habeas corpus relief is a judge-made
doctrine founded on comity and a proper regard for the position of the states in
American federalism. Section 2254 of Title 28 is a congressional limitation on
federal habeas corpus. It is not an absolute limitation.”).
91. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 516 (1972) (holding that the petitioner
had met the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine where direct appeal was no
longer available).
92. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1289–90 (8th Cir. 1975) (determining that
the exhaustion doctrine was satisfied where the arguments were presented to the
highest court in the state, and that court declined to rule on the issue).
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remedies or if protections of prisoners’ rights are otherwise
93
ineffective.
Where a prisoner has failed to present his or her constitutional
claim to a state court, a federal court, upon receiving the habeas
petition, must conduct a four-step analysis to determine whether it
94
can hear the case. The preliminary question is whether the
prisoner presented the constitutional claims contained within the
95
habeas petition to the state court. If the claims were not
presented, the court would next look at whether the exhaustion
doctrine has been met because there are no state remedies
96
available or the available state remedies are futile. If the prisoner
has not presented his or her claims and state remedies exist, the
court must look at whether the prisoner has an excuse for not
97
presenting the claims in state court. If the prisoner can establish a
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012) (stating that a habeas petition
cannot be granted unless “there is an absence of available State corrective process;
or . . . circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights
of the applicant.”); Pate, 343 F.2d at 547.
94. Smittie v. Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295, 296 (8th Cir. 1988).
95. Id.
96. Id. The Court has not entertained whether the foreclosure of habeas to a
released prisoner constitutes a lack of available remedy, but the fact that the Court
chose not to discuss the lack of state remedy in Heck may be telling. See supra note
61. On the other hand, earlier habeas cases may shed some light on what the
Court might do. See Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238–39 (1949) (“Unless habeas
corpus is available, therefore, we are led to believe that Illinois offers no post-trial
remedy in cases of this kind. The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies, to
which this Court has required the scrupulous adherence of all federal courts, see
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572 and cases cited,
presupposes that some adequate state remedy exists.”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
433–35 (1963) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 did not cut off habeas relief unless
prisoner intended to thwart the state court’s jurisdiction), overruled by Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Cady, 405 U.S. at 516 (“This Court has repeatedly
made it plain that not every state procedural default bars federal habeas corpus
relief. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c), which require a state prisoner to exhaust
available state remedies, are limited in their application to those state remedies
still open to the habeas applicant at the time he files his application in federal
court.”).
97. Smittie, 843 F.2d at 296. To satisfy this “cause” requirement, the plaintiff
must show that there was “some objective factor external to the defense . . . .”
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 479 (1986). Courts have found cause in the
context of ineffective assistance of counsel, provided the prisoner can meet the
burdens contained in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Murray, 477
U.S. at 488. The Strickland standard requires that the defendant show that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that
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valid excuse, the prisoner must also show that he or she will be
98
prejudiced if the case is dismissed on procedural grounds.
The cause and prejudice requirements may not be necessary in
exceptional instances where a default would lead to a miscarriage
99
of justice and the defendant is actually innocent.
V. ANALYSIS
A.

Section 1983 Does Not Support the Application of the Favorable
Termination Rule to Claims by Released Prisoners
1.

Section 1983 Was Not Based on Principals of Comity but Was
Specifically Meant to Interfere in State Affairs

The above history of § 1983 lends support to not applying Heck
100
to out-of-custody prisoners. While the majority in Heck correctly
noted that the habeas corpus statute was meant to support comity,
101
§ 1983 clearly was not. To the contrary, § 1983 was passed
the defendant was in fact prejudiced by the deficiency. 466 U.S. at 687. The Court
has also found cause where the constitutional issue is novel. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S.
1, 15 (1984) (“Counsel’s failure to raise a claim for which there was no reasonable
basis in existing law does not seriously implicate any of the concerns that might
otherwise require deference to a State’s procedural bar. Just as it is reasonable to
assume that a competent lawyer will fail to perceive the possibility of raising such a
claim, it is also reasonable to assume that a court will similarly fail to appreciate
the claim. It is in the nature of our legal system that legal concepts, including
constitutional concepts, develop slowly, finding partial acceptance in some courts
while meeting rejection in others.”). More often, however, courts have rejected
prisoners’ arguments. See Henderson v. Cohn, 919 F.2d 1270, 1273 (7th Cir. 1990)
(illiteracy); Rodriguez v. Maynard, 948 F.2d 684, 687–88 (10th Cir. 1991) (pro se,
lacked legal training, unaware of issue); Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058
(8th Cir. 1988) (lack of English skills); Cornman v. Armontrout, 959 F.2d 727,
729–30 (8th Cir. 1992) (unaware of claims, below-average intelligence); Harris v.
Knipp, No. C 12–05114 YGR (PR), 2013 WL 6234651, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2,
2013) (unaware of prosecutor’s unconstitutional actions).
98. Smittie, 843 F.2d at 296.
99. Murray, 477 U.S. at 495–96 (citation omitted) (“We remain confident
that, for the most part, ‘victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet
the cause-and-prejudice standard.’ But we do not pretend that this will always be
true. Accordingly, we think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a
federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause
for the procedural default.”).
100. See supra Part II.
101. Compare supra text accompanying notes 28–30 (describing the purposes
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specifically to interfere in state affairs. As the § 1983 framers
understood it, the Act was specifically designed to thwart laws
passed by states that would infringe on the constitutional rights of
103
state citizens. These concerns arose from the Black Codes, which
were passed shortly after the emancipation of the slaves in an effort
104
to keep freed slaves in their place, both literally and figuratively.
Further, the Act was meant to spur the enforcement of laws
equally by allowing recovery of damages to the victims of abuse at
105
the hands of officials. This would certainly meddle in the affairs
of states.
Arguably, the second purpose of the Act, i.e., to supplement
state law, would not directly interfere with states’ laws. However,
monetary damages for lack of a sufficient remedy would interfere
just as easily as monetary damages for inequitable application of a
law. Additionally, the creation of a federal forum for wronged
106
parties would certainly interfere in intrastate affairs. This was
particularly true in the case of Blyew, in which a young woman
witnessed the murder of several family members, but was unable to
of § 1983 as intending to impede state attempts to deprive black persons of civil
rights) with supra text accompanying notes 89–90 (describing the tension between
state and federal courts giving rise to the exhaustion doctrine).
102. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also supra text accompanying notes 28–32
(describing the purpose of the statute as meant to override certain state actions
and place checks on state actors).
103. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 173–74.
106. The impact of the federal forum for § 1983 claims is undeniable.
Researchers have asserted that § 1983 actions make up approximately ten percent
of federal district courts’ civil caseload. Roger A. Hanson & Henry W.K. Daley,
Challenging the Conditions of Prisons and Jails: A Report on Section 1983 Litigation, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. i, iii (Bureau of Justice Statistics ed., 1994) [hereinafter Conditions of
Prisons and Jails], http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/CCOPAJ.PDF. The
volume of § 1983 cases have increased over time. In 1966 there were just 218 §
1983 cases. Id. at 2. The 1961 Monroe case was largely responsible for opening the
doors of the federal courts to § 1983 actions even though § 1983 had been in
existence since the late 1800s. Karen M. Blum & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Section 1983
Litigation, FED. JUD. CTR. 1, 2 . (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 1998), http://www.fjc.gov
/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Sect1983.pdf/$file/Sect1983.pdf. The Monroe decision,
coupled with the decision in Cooper v. Pate, 278 U.S. 546 (1964), which held that
prisoners have constitutional rights, caused the number of § 1983 cases to
skyrocket. See Conditions of Prisons and Jails, supra, at 1–2. This led to a total of
26,824 § 1983 cases in 1992. Id. at 2.
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testify against the white defendants under Kentucky law. The
chance of having to answer for crimes and other misdeeds in
108
federal courts was—and continues to be—compelling.
The Court has noted the importance of applying the specific
109
statute of habeas corpus over the general statute of § 1983.
However, § 1983 was much more specific in its aims: to override
110
states in matters of constitutional violations. Due to the specific
design of § 1983, it should not cede to the general principal of
111
comity found within the habeas corpus statute. The Heck rule
should not be applied to out-of-custody cases, particularly in light
of the fact that the framers of the Act did not intend to defer to the
112
states as the Court has.
2.

Where a Prisoner Has Been Kept in Violation of Constitutional
Rights, State Law Requires Supplementation

The second lesson we can gather from history is that applying
Heck to cases in which the prisoner is out of custody runs afoul of
113
the second purpose of § 1983—supplementing state law. Senator
Sherman used the example of a black person who had a case
against a white person, but was unable to testify at trial due to local
114
rules. In that example, the federal court would be able to provide
115
a venue where a black person could testify against a white person.
The case of a released prisoner is similar. In the case of a
prisoner released from state custody, the habeas claims would likely
116
be mooted. In these situations, § 1983 should act as it was

107. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the Blyew
case).
108. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the Hibma case in
which a man was framed by local law enforcement officers for burglaries that they
themselves had committed).
109. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 20 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring).
110. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172–74 (discussing the three purposes of the
statute).
111. See supra text accompanying note 67.
112. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172–74.
113. See id. at 173; supra text accompanying note 29 (citing state laws that
would not allow a black person to testify against a white person as one reason for
the statute).
114. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (providing cases for every state
in the Eighth Circuit in which a habeas corpus petition was dismissed for mootness
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intended—to supplement state law where state law does not supply
117
redress for harms committed under color of state authority. If a
prisoner is wrongfully imprisoned, they should be released and
compensated for the violation of their constitutional rights.
One could argue that the danger of a § 1983 petition being
mooted is fairly slim. Habeas corpus cases can take years to make it
through the court system. The median processing time for a habeas
118
petition is about six months. Ten percent of cases take upwards
119
of seven hundred days. Most habeas petitions come from violent
120
offenders. However, 39 percent of habeas petitions come from
121
other offenders. The Bureau of Justice Statistics has found that
the average sentence actually served by violent offenders was forty122
five months.
We might be tempted to conclude that the
possibility of a habeas petition being mooted is low, given that most
123
prisoners who petition are serving roughly four years in prison.
However, the fact that only persons with long sentences are
petitioning may be a symptom of the problem. Prisoners with valid
complaints are not petitioning because the petition will be moot by
124
the time it goes through the process. Under Heck, the favorable
termination rule would work to have the same depressing effect on
125
§ 1983 claims.
3.

The U.S. Supreme Court Is Likely to Settle the Case in Favor of
Allowing the Claims

The next time the Court is required to address the issue, it is
likely to find that the favorable termination rule does not apply to
after the petitioner was released from confinement).
117. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173.
118. Roger A. Hanson & Henry W.K. Daley, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Habeas
Corpus Review: Challenging State Court Criminal Convictions, DEP’T. OF JUST. 1, 17, 19
(Tom Hester ed., 1995), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/FHCRCSCC.PDF.
119. Id. at 19.
120. Id. at 11.
121. Id. Twenty-seven percent are from burglary, theft, drug trafficking, or
weapons charges. Id. Another 12 percent come from other offenders. Id.
122. Paula M. Ditton & Doris James Wilson, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Truth in
Sentencing in State Prisons, DEP’T. OF JUST. 1 (Tom Hester & Tina Dorsey eds., 1999),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf.
123. See id.
124. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing the probability that
prisoners with shorter sentences will be precluded from filing § 1983 claims).
125. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).
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released prisoners. Both Justices Thomas and Kennedy were in the
Heck and Spencer majorities, although Thomas also filed a separate
126
concurrence. Both Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were in the
127
Spencer concurrence. The views of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Alito remain hidden. Following the
death of Justice Scalia, there will likely be a new liberal justice
128
appointed to the Court. If all of the liberal justices, including
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, follow the previous positions of
Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, there will be a five-vote majority
129
against the application of the Heck rule to released prisoners.
Application of the favorable termination rule to released prisoners
130
has a slight advantage according to current voting records.
However, the application of the courts of appeals may push
the needle in the other direction. Currently, the Second, Fourth,
Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that § 1983 is
131
not foreclosed to released prisoners. On the other side, only four
circuits have applied the favorable termination rule to released
132
prisoners. The fact that a majority of jurisdictions have refused to
apply the favorable termination rule because justice so requires
should be compelling where other courts have continued to apply
133
the standard simply because they have decided to wait and see.
Finally, a majority of the Court has already implied that the
favorable termination rule did not apply to released prisoners in
Spencer, where Justice Stevens joined the four concurring justices in
134
holding that § 1983 was not foreclosed to the released prisoner.
126. Id. at 478, 490–91; Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 1 (1998).
127. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 1.
128. Josh Gerstein, Obama’s Supreme Court Short List, POLITICO (Feb. 14, 2016,
6:58 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/antonin-scalia-replacement219271.
129. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 1; Heck, 512 U.S. at 478.
130. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 1; Heck, 512 U.S. at 478.
131. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the
Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits accepted or
applied the Spencer concurrence approach).
132. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the First,
Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits chose to apply the favorable termination rule in
spite of the Spencer concurrence).
133. Compare Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1316–17 (10th Cir. 2010)
(describing the Spencer approach as just), with Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80–
82 (1st Cir. 1998) (choosing to apply what the court viewed as direct precedent
regardless of the weakened holding).
134. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18–25 (reaching a five-justice majority between the
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Stare decisis should guide the current justices in deciding that the
rule does not apply to out-of-custody prisoners.
B.

The Federal Habeas Corpus Statute Does Not Support the Application
of the Favorable Termination Rule to Claims by Released Prisoners
1.

Policy Considerations of the Federal Habeas Corpus Statute Do
Not Support Application of the Favorable Termination Rule to
Claims by Released Prisoners

The Heck Court relied on the exhaustion doctrine as a basis of
135
However, a review of the
the favorable termination rule.
exhaustion doctrine shows that it is more nuanced and forgiving
than the Court acknowledged.
136
The purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is comity, and due
137
to its basis in comity, the doctrine cannot be used like a club.
However, because the aims of the doctrine are necessarily
tempered by the needs of prisoners, courts and the legislature have
138
adopted equitable safeguards. For instance, the four-step analysis
adopted by courts ensures that prisoners will be heard when they
139
have a legitimate claim. The last two steps in the analysis, known
as the cause and prejudice standard, allow a prisoner to make his
140
or her case that the default was excused. The Court has even
offered an additional protection where the cause and prejudice
standard cannot be met, which requires a showing of actual
141
innocence and a potential miscarriage of justice.
Thus, where the Heck Court slammed the door on Heck,
analysis under the exhaustion doctrine would have required the
Court to dig deeper into the circumstances of Heck’s default: Is
there an excusable reason for not presenting the claims in state
court? Will the prisoner be prejudiced by the default? Will the
four-justice concurrence and Justice Stevens’ dissent).
135. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 479.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 83–89 (discussing the tension between
state and federal habeas actions and the statute’s attempts to compromise the two
interests).
137. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973);
Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546, 547 (5th Cir. 1965) (discussing the importance of
using the exhaustion doctrine judiciously as it is based on comity).
138. See Braden, 410 U.S. at 490; Pate, 343 F.2d at 547.
139. See Smittie v. Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295, 296 (8th Cir. 1988).
140. See id.
141. See id.
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default result in a miscarriage of justice? Is the prisoner actually
innocent?
The purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is not served by
throwing up a complete bar. The exhaustion doctrine is meant to
keep prisoners from prematurely removing constitutional issues
from state to federal courts and to maintain comity between federal
142
and state court systems.
However, state courts are not
disrespected where federal courts hear a prisoner petition that is
143
completely mooted in the state court. Nor is there a risk of
prematurely removing constitutional claims from state to federal
courts due to the fact that the prisoner does not have a cause of
action in state court.
There is a concern that this analysis would open the hoary
floodgates to the federal courts. One would expect that due to the
large amount of procedural protections for the prisoner, very few
claims would be rejected based on failure to exhaust state claims.
However, in 1995, sixty-three percent of all habeas claims were
dismissed on procedural grounds without ever reaching the
144
merits.
Of the sixty-three percent dismissed on procedural
grounds, over half of those were rejected based on the failure to
145
exhaust state remedies. This shows that allowing these safeguards
will not require federal courts to slog through the merits of each
146
and every petition, just the deserving cases.
The Court was correct when it stated that § 1983 did not afford
a remedy in all circumstances, but a complete analysis would show
that a remedy is not necessarily barred in these circumstances
either.

142. Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1971).
143. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); see supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
144. Hanson & Daley, supra note 118, at 17. Only thirty-five percent of the
claims go on to be denied on the merits. Id.
145. Id.
146. Just one percent of petitions were granted on the merits. Id. Another one
percent of cases were remanded to state courts. Id.
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2.

The Plain Language of the Statute Does Not Support the
Application of the Favorable Termination Rule to Claims by
Released Prisoners

The first two steps from the four-step analysis come to us from
147
the statute itself. They require an examination of whether there is
148
a state remedy and whether that state remedy is adequate. If
there is no state remedy or if it is inadequate, federal courts are
149
instructed to hear the case. These prongs of the analysis are
written in the disjunctive, thus allowing a claim to be heard even if
150
state claims are not exhausted. Of course, this makes sense, as it
would be difficult for a prisoner to exhaust remedies that never
existed.
For the released prisoner, this is particularly important. The
claims of the released prisoner would be moot under state and
151
federal habeas corpus case law. The favorable termination rule
simply allows courts to ignore habeas corpus analysis, which
requires a federal court to examine the adequacy and existence of
state remedies.
3.

Habeas Corpus Case Law Does Not Support the Application of the
Favorable Termination Rule to Claims by Released Prisoners

Case law prior to Heck generally held that the exhaustion
doctrine only applied to the claims that were alive for the purposes
152
of state relief.
If the claim was not extinguished on state procedural grounds,
153
it was ripe for relief under a federal habeas petition. The Court at
one time went so far as to declare that the habeas statute only

147. Smittie v. Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295, 296 (8th Cir. 1988).
148. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
149. Smittie, 843 F.2d at 296.
150. Id.
151. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). The Court determined that a
habeas petition was moot once the prisoner was no longer incarcerated. Id. at 18.
Most state courts within the Eighth Circuit have reached the same conclusion
when examining state habeas petitions.
152. See, e.g., Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1289–90 (8th Cir. 1975).
153. Id. (citing Smith v. Wolff, 506 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1974)) (“[T]he
exhaustion standard is not an inflexible requirement: it is a rule of comity and not
a rule limiting the power of the federal courts to give habeas relief.”).
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barred claims where there was an attempt by the petitioner to
154
circumvent state jurisdiction.
C.

The Favorable Termination Approach

Courts could, instead of relying on the lessons of § 1983 and §
2254, take another approach. A recent United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota decision has already interpreted the
requirement of favorable termination broadly to allow for the
155
possible recovery of a released prisoner. The Steadman case is
strikingly similar to the facts as described in Newcomb. Steadman’s
judicially imposed sentence was meant to expire on December 9,
156
2012. However, the Minnesota Department of Corrections added
a five-year term of probation administratively, in spite of the
Newcomb court’s clear directive that the Minnesota Department of
Corrections did not have the power to unilaterally take such
157
action. Steadman failed to meet the terms of his administratively158
added probation, and he was arrested on August 21, 2013. At
some time before December 3, 2013, a Minnesota Department of
159
Corrections employee began inquiring into Steadman’s status.
The Minnesota Department of Corrections then released Steadman
160
on January 16, 2014. Upon release, Steadman received a letter
from Eddie Miles, Jr., the warden of Minnesota Correctional
Facility-Lino Lakes, which stated:
On November 5, 2007, Ramsey County District Court
sentenced you to the commissioner of corrections. Under
the interpretation of the law at that time, the Department
added a 5–year term of Conditional Release pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 169A.276 subd. 1(d). The term of
Conditional release [sic] has been removed from your
154. See id. at 1290 (quoting Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)) (“[I]t
would be unseemly in our dual system of government for the federal district court
to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to
correct a constitutional violation.”).
155. Steadman v. Roy, No. 14-3442, 2015 WL 1954402, at *15 (D. Minn. Mar.
23, 2015). See Wilson v. Lawrence Cty., Mo., 154 F.3d 757, 761 (8th Cir. 1998)
(“Wilson’s pardon is therefore an ‘executive order’ that ‘expunged,’ ‘obliterated,’
and ‘invalidated’ his conviction. Heck requires nothing more.”).
156. Steadman, 2015 WL 1954402, at *2.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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sentence and you are hereby discharged as of December
161
22, 2012 . . . .
In applying Heck, the court focused on the language of Heck
regarding what constitutes a favorable termination:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
162
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The court reasoned that Heck expressly allowed for a favorable
163
termination through “expunge[ment] by executive order.” The
court also observed that the Eighth Circuit had previously held that
an executive pardon was a means to favorable termination under
164
the expungement-by-executive-order umbrella.
The Steadman
court went on to hold that the favorable termination requirement
was met in Steadman’s case because “an agency within the
executive branch of the State of Minnesota—the DOC—via the
letter from Eddie Miles Jr., not only discharged Steadman from
custody, but it also retroactively removed the entire term of
165
conditional release that it had imposed on Steadman.”
The first observation is that the court’s reading of the
executive expungement option is incredibly broad and likely a
product of the procedural posture of the case. The opinion was
166
issued following a motion to dismiss. The court managed to avoid
ruling on whether there was an expungement by arguing that the
facts before the court had not yet been developed adequately to
167
rule on the issue.
168
Expungement generally has one of two meanings. The first is
169
to erase a criminal conviction from a record. A second definition
161. Id. at *3.
162. Id. at *11 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)).
163. Id.
164. Id. at *14 (citing Wilson v. Lawrence Cty., Mo., 154 F.3d 757, 761 (8th
Cir. 1998)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at *1.
167. Id. at *14.
168. Wilson, 154 F.3d at 760. The court at the time was working with a 1990
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is “[t]o erase or destroy . . . [t]o declare (a vote or other action)
null and outside the record, so that it is noted in the original
170
record as expunged, and redacted from all future copies.” The
actual practices of the states lend themselves to the second
definition.
In actual practice, each state within the Eighth Circuit has a
171
special provision for expungement. In all of these provisions, the
172
courts carry out the act of expungement. Parties are required to
173
petition the courts for relief from conviction. In these states, the
174
executive branch has no role in criminal expungement. Thus, the
literal interpretation of the language of Heck would leave it
completely inapplicable as there are no executive branch
expungements in the Eighth Circuit. Many of these statutory
procedures addressing expungement, however, require favorable
175
termination of the underlying criminal charges.
Nonetheless, overextending the definition may be
problematic. For instance, finding that the letter is an executive
expungement does not further the purpose for which the favorable
termination rule was created. The rule was created so that a later
version of Black’s Law Dictionary. See id. The definition has since been amended.
169. Expungement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (9th ed. 2009).
170. Id. The Wilson court noted that it preferred the definition “[t]o destroy;
blot out; obliterate; erase; efface designedly; strike out wholly.” 154 F.3d at 760
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 582 (6th ed. 1990)). According to the Wilson
court, this is the more common definition. Id.
171. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and
2015 1st Ex. Sess. of the 90th Ark. Gen. Assemb.); MINN. STAT. § 609A.03 (2015);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.140 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen.
Assemb.) (effective on Aug. 28, 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3523 (West,
Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 104th Leg.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 1903.1-23, 31-13-07 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of 64th Leg. Assemb.);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-27 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 123.46(6), 123.47(8) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413; MINN. STAT. § 609A.03; MO. ANN. STAT. §
610.140; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3523; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 19-03.1-23, 3113-07; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-27; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.46(6), 123.47(8).
173. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609A.02 (2015) (describing the circumstances
under which a person may petition a court for an expungement).
174. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413; MINN. STAT. § 609A.02; MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 610.140; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3523; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 19-03.1-23; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-27; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.46(6), 123.47(8).
175. See MINN. STAT. § 609A.02 (allowing for expungement of certain records
where there was either a favorable termination or the sentence was stayed); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3523.
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verdict in a civil litigation could not call into question the original
176
criminal convictions. Allowing such a letter to satisfy the favorable
termination rule would allow a collateral attack on the underlying
conviction because the letter had no effect on it. The letter only
stated that Steadman was being discharged (presumably from
177
probation) and that the five-year term was being removed. If a
similar letter—one stating that the term of probation had been
removed and upon release there would be no probationary
period—was given to an inmate who was still serving the original
sentence, this reading of the favorable termination rule would
allow the inmate to prosecute a § 1983 claim from his or her jail
cell.
While extending the reaches of executive expungement may
be satisfying as a practical matter, there is a danger that
overextension could lead to unintended results.
D.

The Fact or Length of Confinement Approach

Steadman likewise argued that his § 1983 petition was not
challenging the fact or length of his confinement, but rather only
challenged the constitutionality of the administrative term of his
178
probation.
The U.S. Supreme Court once alluded to the fact that a
former prisoner seeking money damages would not implicate the
179
favorable termination rule. The Court rooted this dictum in the
180
purposes of the habeas statute. The Court reasoned that the
original purpose of the statute was for a prisoner to obtain release
181
from unlawful imprisonment.
Unfortunately, courts have generally held that a § 1983 claim
could have preclusive effects on habeas proceedings regardless of
182
the relief sought. This would bring to life the fears of a myriad of
§ 1983 actions causing havoc with convictions everywhere.

176. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994).
177. Steadman v. Roy, No. 14-3442, 2015 WL 1954402, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar.
23, 2015).
178. Id. at *12.
179. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973).
180. Id.
181. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1971).
182. Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1074 (8th Cir. 1996).
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A Better Rule

The better rule, rather than following dicta in Heck, would be
for the Eighth Circuit to recognize that the problem lies at the
crossroads of two statutes, neither of which allow the door to be
slammed in the face of a prisoner with a viable claim. Even though,
as discussed above, § 1983 gives little deference to comity, comity
183
can and should be served under the habeas corpus statute.
In the case of prisoners suing for monetary damages under §
1983, this requires the Eighth Circuit to submit the claims to the
complete analysis of the exhaustion doctrine. First, the court must
184
look at whether the claims were in fact presented. Second, the
court must determine whether there are no state remedies or if the
185
state remedy is futile. Third, the prisoner must establish that
there was cause that could excuse the prisoner’s failure to present
186
the claims to the state court. Fourth, the prisoner must establish
187
that the prisoner will be prejudiced if the claim cannot be heard.
Finally, the court must look at whether refusing to hear the case
will result in a miscarriage of justice, and whether the prisoner was
188
innocent-in-fact.
In the case of a prisoner released from custody, two issues
arise. The first is whether a state remedy exists when the prisoner is
out of custody. The Court has thus far not been required to
examine whether state remedies are foreclosed once a prisoner is
released because the Court has defaulted to the federal mootness
189
analysis. The Eighth Circuit should conclude that release from
prison does foreclose state remedies for the purpose of this
analysis. First, both state and federal courts have generally held that

183. See supra Section V.B.1 (discussing the importance of comity in the
habeas corpus statute).
184. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 516 (1972).
185. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1289–90 (8th Cir. 1975).
186. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii) (2012); Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546,
547 (5th Cir. 1965).
187. Smittie v. Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295, 296 (8th Cir. 1988).
188. Id. at 297.
189. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); see Anderson v. State, 98 S.W.3d
403, 404 (Ark. 2003) ; Case v. Wood, 377 N.W.2d 924, 924 (Minn. 1985); State ex
rel. D.W. v. Hensley, 574 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); State ex rel.
Magrum v. Nygaard, 38 N.W.2d 370, 370 (N.D. 1949); Moeller v. Solem, 395
N.W.2d 165, 165–66 (S.D. 1986).
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release from prison moots habeas corpus claims.
The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that the absence of a habeas remedy
191
means that the state remedy is foreclosed. The Eighth Circuit
need only apply the same principal and case law to § 1983 cases.
A federal court may be required, however, to interpret state
law regarding whether the petition is actually foreclosed. This is
nothing new; the Court has required the same analysis in other
cases by holding that the exhaustion doctrine only applies to issues
192
that are alive.
Determining which claims are alive or dead
necessarily would require a court to delve into state law.
The second issue is whether the fact that the prisoner has been
released from prison is cause for not bringing the claims to a state
tribunal. The Court has only allowed narrow factual circumstances
193
to provide cause. A released prisoner could potentially rely on
194
the novelty of the constitutional issue. In the case study discussed
in the introduction, for instance, the prisoner, the Minnesota
Commissioner of Corrections, and the courts did not know that the
practices involved were unconstitutional until the case went up on
195
appeal. A released prisoner may be able to succeed where they
196
An ineffective
can show ineffective assistance of counsel.
assistance of counsel claim is further limited by the requirement
197
that it meet the Strickland standard. The prisoner must show that

190. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7; see Anderson, 98 S.W.3d at 404; Case, 377 N.W.2d at
924; D.W., 574 S.W.2d at 391; Magrum, 38 N.W.2d at 370; Moeller, 395 N.W.2d at
165–66.
191. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying note 93.
193. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that the cause
requirement may be met by a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but little
else).
194. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (citing a number of different
arguments that have been unsuccessful in the habeas context, including the
novelty of the issue).
195. State ex rel. Newcomb v. Roy, No. A10-2075, 2011 WL 2437489, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2011); see Steadman v. Roy, No. 14-3442, 2015 WL
1954402, at *12 (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 2015) (discussing the Minnesota
Commissioner of Correction’s duty to change the policies of the Minnesota
Department of Corrections after it was determined in Newcomb that the
administrative addition of conditional release was unconstitutional).
196. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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counsel fell below an objective standard and that the prisoner was
198
prejudiced by the faulty representation.
VI. CONCLUSION
When a prisoner submits a claim under § 1983, the claim rests
199
at the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas corpus statute.
However, neither of those statutes supports the application of
Heck’s favorable termination rule to cases in which released
200
prisoners bring a claim under § 1983. The favorable termination
rule would bar the claim where state remedies were not first
201
exhausted. In the case of released prisoners, this would mean a
complete bar to the claim, as the claims of prisoners are moot for
the purposes of habeas corpus following prisoners’ release from
202
custody.
The better rule is to apply the four-step analysis courts apply to
203
the exhaustion doctrine. This would allow a released prisoner to
make his or her case that state remedies are no longer available
204
due to mootness. It would further allow the prisoner to show
205
cause and prejudice. This is a difficult standard to meet, which
would likely mean that the proverbial floodgates would not be
206
opened. In fact, there are a very few and narrow situations in
207
which a released prisoner could succeed. One of these may be
where the claim is so novel that the prisoner did not recognize it
208
until after the prisoner was released. Another situation may be
where ineffective assistance of counsel led to a failure to make a
209
petition or submit a faulty petition. In relying on mere dicta in
Heck and waiting for clearer guidance from the Court, the Eighth

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 479 (1994).
See supra Sections V.A–B.
See Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1971).
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See supra Section V.E.
See supra Section V.E.
See supra Section V.E.
See supra Section V.E.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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Circuit has taken the path of least resistance. The path of least
resistance has made this particular river crooked.

210.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492–96 (1994).

